Civic Participation and the Equality Problem

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By civic engagement is on the decline, does it really...
Why Care about Civic Engagement?

Of the three broad justifications for concern about civic engagement, the Fran—they that develop the capacity of the individual—derives from John Stuart Mill. According to the various versions of this perspective, voluntary action is educational, and those who take part become in many ways better human beings—more independent, efficacious, and competen. better to their capacities for thought, greater in their respect for others, and their willingness to take responsibility, better able to appreciate their own interests and those of the community. The second argument that on-behalf of civic engagement, its salutary implications for the creation of community and democracy, is in many ways a corollary to the first. In this case the educational effects of civic participation are valued not for their meaning for the individual but for their consequences for community and democracy. The best to Tocqueville who make this argument across several themes. They point to the democratic orientations and skills that develop when people work together voluntarily—social must, norm of reciprocity and cooperation, and the capacity to transcend narrow points of view and conceptual the common good. In short, when there is a vigorous sector of voluntary involvement—and the strong institutional foundations that underlies it—it becomes easier for communities, and democratic rationales, to engage in joint activity and to produce public goods. Moreover, a vital area of voluntary activity between individual and state protects citizens from overweening state power and preserves freedom.

The third rationale for concern about civic engagement shifts the emphasis from shared community interests to the conflicting interests of individuals and groups and focuses on social protection of interests. Interests, this perspective argues, transcend from Machiavelli’s fundamental insight in Federalist No. 10 that differences of opinion are sworn in the nature of humankind. Especially in the unequal acquisition of property. Through the medium of political participation, citizens communicate information about their preferences and needs for government action and

2. See, for example, Bhagat (1997), Bouma (1970), and Levy (1995).
4. Meta-community refers to the inter-related results of collective action that run across to

meta-community and transnational. Trans groups—for example, cultural—hardly present them self

value. Moreover, organization of the world is a loss issue as well as cooperation. See for example, the argument and evidence presented in Pape and Stubbs (1997) and Stremmel (1987).
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generate pressure on public officials to heed what they hear. Of course, we know that public officials act for many reasons, only one of which is their assessment of what the public wants and needs. And policymakers have ways other than the medium of citizen participation to learn what citizens want and need from the government. Nonetheless, what public officials hear clearly influences what they do. Therefore, as long as citizens differ in their opinions and interests, the level of citizen participation in policy-making is likely to vary. For example, writing letters to public officials, attending protests, or making political contributions—these are all manifestations of the role of civic activity in promoting the representational aspect of democracy.

The question raised by an emphasis on equal participation is somewhat different from that raised by a focus on the development of the individual in the context of community and democracy. First, the cooperative nature of voluntary activity that fosters individual freedom is more democratically relevant. In contrast, the voluntary activity that fosters individual freedom is less democratic. Furthermore, when it is a matter of the education of individuals or the cultivation of democratic habits, the aggregate quantity of civic engagement is critical. What we need is a conception of civic engagement that integrates the interests of individuals with the interests of society. In this context, the voluntary activity that fosters individual freedom is less relevant. However, the voluntary activity that fosters individual freedom is more relevant. What we need is a conception of civic engagement that integrates the interests of individuals with the interests of society.

As (1978) and Berry (1972)

5. This chapter draws largely from the findings of the John Boyd book "Voting: Schuman, and
deed (1995), as well as subsequent investigations reported in Iyengar, Schuman, and Velez (1999).
The Citizen Participation Study

We employ data from the Citizen Participation Study, a large-scale, two-stage survey of the voluntary activity of the American public. The first stage consisted of over 15,000 telephone interviews of a random sample of American adults that we conducted during the last six months of 1989. These twenty-minute face-to-face interviews provided a profile of political and nonpolitical activity as well as basic demographic information. In the spring of 1990, we conducted much longer, in-person interviews with a stratified random sample of 2,517 of the original 15,000 respondents chosen so as to produce a disproportionate number of those active in politics as well as of African Americans and Latinos. The data in this chapter are from the 2,517 respondents in the follow-up survey. The data presented are weighted to produce an effective random sample.

Understanding Political Participation

Though their activity, citizens in a democracy seek to control who will hold public office and to influence what the government does. Political participation provides the mechanism by which citizens can communicate information about their interests, preferences, and needs—and generate pressure to respond. In a meaningful democracy, the people’s voice must be clear and loud—clear so that policymakers understand citizen concerns and loud so that they have an incentive to pay attention to what is said. Since democracy implies not only governmental responsiveness to citizen interests but also equal consideration of the interests of each citizen, democratic participation must also be equal.

In thinking about why some people are active and others are not, we find it helpful to invert the usual question and to ask instead why people do not participate in politics. Three answers immediately suggest themselves because they can’t, because they don’t want to, or because nobody asked.

“They can’t,” suggests a paucity of necessary resources—time to take part, money to contribute to campaigns and other political causes, and skills to use time and money effectively. “They don’t want to,” focuses

6. A more detailed description of the sample, the sample weights that allow the sample to be scaled as a random sample, and a listing of the relevant resources can be found in the appendix in K. Schlozman, S. Verba, and H. E. Brady (1995).
Participation

In a democracy seek to control who will see what the government does. Political leaders by which citizens can communicate to, influence, and receive, and generate political democracy, the people's voice must policymakers understand citizen concerns receive to pay attention to what is said, by governmental responsiveness to citizen location of the interests of each, citizen, to be equal.

As a people are active and serious are not, we at question, and so asked instead why people as showing immediately suggest themselves:

- don't want to be named for fear of labor
- are the same feelings that allow the simple to be better
- community members can be found in the apartment is. What

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attention on the absence of political engagement—lack of interest in politics of little concern with public issues, a belief that activity can make little or no difference, little or no knowledge about the political process or other priorities. Nobody asked, implies isolation from the networks of recruitment through which citizens are stimulated to politics. These three components—recruitment, engagement, and recruitment—are the backbones of an explanatory model of citizen participation that we call the Civic Volunteering Model. Our discussions of participatory inequalities in this chapter focus on the first and last of this trio of participatory factors.

Participatory Inequality in America

As it is in so many other ways, American politics is special when it comes to citizen participation. That voter turnout in the United States lags behind voter turnout in other democracies is well known. What is less frequently acknowledged is that in other forms of political activity—for example, campaigning, being active in the local community, or contacting government officials—Americans are as active as, or substantially more active than, citizens elsewhere. What is distinctive about political participation in America, however, is that it is as unequal distribution, leaving more closely to the fact, lines of social class. In the United States the show introduced by the relationship between high levels of education or income and high levels of political activity—a bias characteristic of political participation in democracies around the world—a special pronounced.

Recent trends in American politics have significant consequences for the nature of political activity and the extent of participatory inequalities. The masculinization and professionalization of both our political parties and organized interests have redefined the role of citizen activist as, increasingly, a writer of checks and letters. The rise of mass mail and electronic communication and the concentration of citizens' groups and political action committees devoted to media-intensive and increasingly costly election campaigns to enhance the relative importance of cash as a medium of participatory input. This development has profound implications for political equality among citizens. A participatory system in which individual financial contributions figure so importantly is characterized by extreme inequality of participatory input. The target of people whose voices are heard and the range of issues stimulate are narrowed with the result
that the democratic ideal of the equal representation of the needs and preferences of all citizens is jeopardized.

**Of Time and Money**

If we compare the distinctive properties of time and money as forms of participatory input, we can understand why, as money gains in relative importance, the participatory system becomes less equal. As resources for politics, time and money differ in that time is both more constrained and more evenly distributed than is money. Time, unlike money, cannot be banked for later use if not expended today. Furthermore, in contrast to money, there is a fixed upper bound on time: the best-endowed of us has only twenty-four hours a day. Because time is inherently limited, disposable time is more evenly distributed among individuals than is disposable income. Even allowing for the difference in the metrics, the gap in dollars between the richest and poorest is far wider than the gap in hours between the busiest and most leisureed. Indeed, of all the resources that facilitate political involvement, money is the most satisfied.²

Who enjoys the luxury of excess money or of time to devote, if desired, to political participation? In one it was not apparent before Hemingway's famous observation, we now know that the rich have more money. What is more, it is well known that income and wealth are distributed more unequally in the United States than they are in other developed democracies. With respect to the question of whether those who are financially well off also have more free time, we might have contradictory expectations. On the one hand, we might guess that the rich would have more free time because they can hire others—gardeners or accountants, for example—to do what most people have to do for themselves. On the other hand, we might expect the rich to have less free time because they manage to accumulate wealth by dint of the long hours they log at work.³ In fact, our data demonstrate that income and other measures of socioeconomic status are not related to the availability of free time. Instead, what determines how

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² On the multiple motives that are useful for political participation, see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, chaps. 10-11).

³ In fact time constraints reflect the opportunity to use these resources, which holds back not just the quantity of leisure but also because they are able to purchase it and that a substitution effect would produce less because they widen the opportunity out of free time. See Bloom (1992).
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much time is available for such life circumstances as having a job, a spouse who works, or children, especially preschool children. Thus, unlike all other politically relevant resources—not only money but also education and various kinds of civic skills—free time does not too the fate line of social stratification.

Because those who are financially well-off are more likely than the less well-healed, as we saw, the increased emphasis on making financial contributions to a form of political activity has potential consequences for participatory equality. Figure 12.1 compares two income groups at the extremes, roughly the bottom fifth (who had family incomes below $15,000 at the time of our survey in 1980 and the top fifth (who had family incomes above $75,000), and shows that, with respect to all forms of activity, the former are much more active than the latter. They are less likely to vote, only half as likely to go to a protest or get into touch with a government official, only one-third as likely to engage in informal activity within the community, and only one-tenth as likely to make a campaign donation.

It matters not only whether citizens take part politically but also how much they do. Earlier we mentioned that, as the size of the which there is maintained equality in each citizen's output, the vote is unique among political acts. For other acts, the volume of activity—letters written, dollars contributed, meetings attended, and so on—can be adjusted according to the willingness and wherewithal of the activist. Although the affluent are more likely to be active at both campaign work and campaign door. their relative advantage grows when we consider not simply the size of their activity but also the amount of their activity. Figure 12.2 presents data only for those who were active and shows that, among those who worked as volunteers in campaigns, those in the lowest income group actually gave more time—an average of four hours a week more—than those in the highest income category. Among those who gave money to campaigns, however, the situation is, not unexpectedly, very different. Among given, those at the top of the income ladder gave, on average, nearly four times as much as those at the bottom.

We can push this line of reasoning one step further by using units of participatory input rather than individuals as our metric. Figure 12.3 gives a politician's-eye view of what the citizenry would look like if each income group's visibility depended on the amount of political activity it produced. The upper-left section of Figure 12.3 presents at a baseline the distribution of various family income groupings within the population.
Figure 12-1. Percentage Active in Various Activities:
High- and Low-Income Groups

- Voting
- Campaign work
- Campaign contributions
- Cassette
- Polling
- Informal community activity
- Broad membership
- Affiliated with political organization

a. N = 483 weighted cases.
b. N = 224 weighted cases.

Sources: All and subcategory figures and tables have been adapted from Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (Harvard University Press, 1992) and Brady, Schlozman, and Verba (Harvard University Press, 1995).
Figure 17-2. Mean Hours and Dollars Given to Political Campaigns, by Family Income

The other graphs show the proportion of the population in various income categories weighted by the amount of activity produced by that income group: by the votes citizens cast, the number of hours they work in campaigns, and the number of dollars they contribute to candidates, parties, and campaign organizations. For comparison, we provide information about voluntary activity in nonpolitical domains: the proportion of hours and dollars contributed to charity and to religious institutions by different family income groups.

The active population provides a very different income perspective from the population at large. Those at the top of the income hierarchy produced more than their proportionate share of votes, campaign hours, and campaign dollars. However, the distortion is much less pronounced for votes than for campaign time and, in turn, less for campaign time than for campaign money. The 5 percent of the sample with family income over $125,000 are responsible for 4 percent of the votes, 8 percent of the hours devoted to campaigning, and fully 38 percent of the money contributed. Indeed, the top two income groups, who constitute less than 10
Figure 12-3. Volume of Political and Nonpolitical Activity:
Percentage from Various Family Income Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Level</th>
<th>Poor, under $14,999</th>
<th>$15,000 - $34,999</th>
<th>$35,000 - $49,999</th>
<th>Rich, over $50,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whole Sample (Left)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.B.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign hours (Bottom)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.B.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign dollars (Right)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>charitable hours (Bottom)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.B.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church hours (Bottom)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.B.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church dollars (Right)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Votes

- Poor
- Rich
percent of the sampled population, donated more than half of the money used to conduct campaigns. At the other end of the family income scale are those with family incomes under $15,000, who constitute 15 percent of the sample. They were responsible for 14 percent of the votes and 13 percent of the hours volunteered in campaigns. However, they are barely visible in electoral contributions—donating only 2 percent of the campaign dollars.

Figure 12-3 also shows comparable figures for the hours devoted to charitable activity and to educational, social, or charitable activities associated with a church (beyond attendance at services), as well as for the dollars contributed to charity and to religious institutions. In terms of the volume of voluntary activity, the poor are underrepresented and the affluent overrepresented. Further, the distortions are generally greater in the domain of politics than in other areas and much greater for money than for time. With respect to hours, the poor are underrepresented in all three domains, but by the largest amount for campaign activity. The affluent are overrepresented by a substantial amount in campaigning, and by a smaller amount in charitable hours. They are proportionately represented in the number of hours devoted to church work. Not, in fact, that both the higher- and lower-income groups contribute a proportional share of the church hours, suggesting that the religious domain is the one of greatest relative equality. In terms of dollars, the affluent are overrepresented and the poor underrepresented in the money contributed in all three domains. However, the bias is much less pronounced for donations to religious institutions than for donations to charities. And the bias is greatest for campaign contributions.

It is hardly surprising that those with higher family incomes are more generous in their financial contributions, but not necessarily in the amount of time they give. After all, they have more money—and, in comparison with the poor, they are relatively better off with respect to money than with respect to time. It is less obvious why they should be relatively more generous than those who are less well off in their contributions to political causes in their contributions to charity or church—especially since democratic politics is the arena of voluntary activity with the strongest underly-
ing egalitarian commitment. In an age when candidates rely ever more heavily on campaign contributions, the extent to which campaign dollars come from the wealthy has implications for equality in a democracy.

**Participatory Equity and Government Benefits**

Why should we care that some people are much more active than others and, therefore, that government officials hear much more from some quarters than from others? If those who do not take part in politics are distinctive—in their political opinions and concerns or their need for government action—then the equal protection of interests may be in jeopardy. Our data show clearly that those who are especially active in politics do not necessarily represent the views or the priorities of those who are more quiescent. The government brings different messages from members of groups that are seen especially active. In particular, when those who are disadvantaged by virtue of low levels of education or income do participate, they express distinctive sets of concerns, needs, and opinions.

In the Citizen Participation Study, all respondents who indicated that they, or any family member in the household, received a particular government benefit were asked whether they had been active in relation to that benefit: Had they taken that program into account in deciding how to vote? Had they given a campaign contribution based, at least in part, on concern about it? Had they contacted an official to complain about the program? Did they belong to an organization concerned about that program? Recipients of benefits targeted at the poor (such as means-tested benefits as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), food stamps, or Medicaid) are less likely than recipients of non-means-tested benefits (for example, veterans' benefits, Social Security, or Medicare) to have been active.10

The data in Figure 12-4 show the proportions of the recipients of each benefit who reported an activity related to the benefit program for the

10 Note that the recipient of the question about government benefits was an individual or any intending family member living in the household. In the case where we refer to "food stamp recipients" or "those who received veterans' benefits," the recipients may not have been of the survey respondents. We should also note that although there is a means test for student loans, we are categorizing those with non-means-tested benefits. The level of provable incentive for student loans is much higher that for other means-tested benefits such as food stamps or AFDC, and the beneficiaries are not bound primarily among the poor.
Figure 12-4. Activities of Benefit Recipients Directly Related to Benefit Programs

Percent of benefit recipients

- Non-means-tested benefits
- Social Security
- Medicare
- Veteran's benefits
- Educational loans
- Means-tested benefits
- AFDC
- Medicaid
- Food stamps
- Housing subsidies

- Who Made Voting Decisions in Relation to Program
- Non-means-tested benefits
- Social Security
- Medicare
- Veteran's benefits
- Educational loans
- Means-tested benefits
- AFDC
- Medicaid
- Food stamps
- Housing subsidies

- Who Contributed to a Campaign in Relation to Program
- Non-means-tested benefits
- Social Security
- Medicare
- Veteran's benefits
- Educational loans
- Means-tested benefits
- AFDC
- Medicaid
- Food stamps
- Housing subsidies

- Who Belonged to an Organization Concerned with Program
- Non-means-tested benefits
- Social Security
- Medicare
- Veteran's benefits
- Educational loans
- Means-tested benefits
- AFDC
- Medicaid
- Food stamps
- Housing subsidies

- Less than 1 percent.
kind of activity: voting, contributing, contacting, and membership in an
organization. Clearly recipients of non-means-tested benefits were more
likely to have been active than recipients of means-tested benefits. The
difference is especially striking with respect to campaign donations and
membership in an organization associated with the benefits—with the
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) and veterans' organiza-
tions presumably playing a major role. Thirty-five percent of the recipients
of veterans' benefits and 24 percent of the recipients of Social Security, in
contrast to 2 percent of AFDC recipients and some of the food-stamp
recipients, belonged to an organization concerned about the program.
However, the distinction between recipients of means-tested and non-
means-tested benefits also applies to voting decisions. The data on con-
tacting a public official are interesting; we might expect that inclusion in
the non-means-tested programs would be more or less automatic and thus
would require people to have fewer contacts with public officials. Never-
theless, Medicare recipients were more likely than Medicaid recipients to
communicate with officials about their medical benefits; Social Security
recipients were more likely than AFDC recipients to contact a public
official about their benefits. Clearly, the government hears more from
those on some programs than on others, and the ones it hears from are the
more advantaged citizens.

What Messages Do They Send?

Our concern with understanding the voice of the people led us to do
something novel in our survey. We asked about the basis of activ-
ity—that is, what activity actually say when they take part. Every time
someone indicated having undertaken some kind of political activity, we inquired
whether there were particular issues or problems associated with their

21. It has been suggested to us that the wording of the questions about the relative
importance of political activity for voting decisions is a subtle reflection of the fact that the political leaders have drawn attention to these programs in
their political activities and thus made them more of a political issue than other issues. The candidates make political activity a tool to promote Social Security or veterans' benefits but do not draw attention to these benefits, however, in a political sense by urging or trying to affect what they are bringing from citizens and
the organizations with which they are associated.

12. Similar data are not available. There is relatively little activity in relation to student loans.

However, there is still some activity in relation to student loans than there is in relation to most
means-tested programs.
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participation. Thus we were able to establish the substantive content of what public officials hear from political actors.

Table 12-1 summarizes the subjective matter behind the political activity in which an issue concern was expressed and includes advantages and disadvantages respondents with respect to the issue concern that animated their participation. In order to ensure that we are dealing with issues that were actually communicated to public officials, we focus solely on those activities in which an explicit message can be said connecting an official, portraying a policy, campaign work, or contributions accompanied by a communication, informal community activity, or voluntary service on a local board. The issue-based political act is the unit of analysis, and the figure represents the proportion of all issue-based activities for which the respondent mentioned, among other things, a particular set of policy concerns.

Although both the advantaged and the disadvantaged had wide-ranging policy concerns, the distribution of their concerns differed. Compared with the issue-based activity of the advantaged, that of the disadvantaged is more than twice as likely, and that of respondents in familiar receiving means-tested benefits four times as likely, to have been animated by concerns about basic human needs—poverty, jobs, housing, health, and the like. Moreover, their activity was more likely to have been motivated by concern about drug or crime. The activity of the advantaged, in contrast, was more likely to have been inspired by economic issues such as taxes, government spending, or the budget or by social issues such as abortion or pornography.

When we consider the actual number of communications, however, a very different story emerges. Because the disadvantaged are so much less active than the advantaged, public officials actually hear less about issues related to basic human needs from the disadvantaged than from the slightly smaller group of advantaged respondents—even though references

in the voice of the people led us to do something about the issues of action they take part. Every time someone asks an official about political activity, we asked them about problems associated with their regulation of assistance programs, in voting decisions.

13 The discussion of how these data were gathered and coded, see Verba, Shrauger, and Brady (1995, pp. 44-45, 220-23).

14 Each is estimated on the basis of data from our public and familiar receiving means-tested benefits more than four times as likely to have been motivated by concern about drugs or crime. The activity of the advantaged, in contrast, was more likely to have been inspired by economic issues such as taxes, government spending, or the budget or by social issues such as abortion or pornography.

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### Table 12-1. What Respondents Say: Issue-Based Political Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Disadvantaged</th>
<th>Advantageous</th>
<th>Received mean-attended benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic human needs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax:</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic issues (except taxes)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social issues (except abortion)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime or drugs</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of respondents</strong></td>
<td>2,517</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of issue-based acts</strong></td>
<td>1,556</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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a. This table records only information-rich acts; those in which an explicit message can be sent to policymakers, contacting officials, presenting, doing campaign work or making contributions accompanied by a communication, informal community activity, or voluntary service on a local level. The number in the cells represents the proportion of such acts having identifiable issue centers for which there was a reference in the particular issue.

b. The advantaged were those with at least some college and a family income of $50,000 or more.

c. The disadvantaged were those with no education beyond high school and family income below $15,000.
d. Numbers shown are the weighted numbers of acts and issue bases are.
to basic human needs occupy relatively greater space in the bundle of communications emanating from the disadvantaged.

These findings might suggest that, although the disadvantaged are underrepresented with respect to participatory input, their concerns and needs are nonetheless being expressed by others. When the disadvantaged speak for themselves on issues of basic human needs, however, their communications differ fundamentally from those sent by others. First, when the disadvantaged communicate with public officials about basic human needs, they were much more likely than the advantaged to be concerned about problems that affected them personally. Even affluent citizens may need government assistance with meeting basic human needs; they may have health problems or a handicapped child in school; or, if elderly, receive Medicare and Social Security. Still, a much larger proportion of the messages from the disadvantaged about basic human needs involved particular communications about problems specific to themselves or their families—a question about eligibility for Social Security, a complaint about the conditions in a housing project, or a request by a disabled respondent for special transportation, to cite some actual examples.

Among respondents who mentioned human needs issues as associated with their issue-based activity, 56 percent of the disadvantaged but only 8 percent of the advantaged were motivated by such particularized concerns. Even when the human needs issues were framed as a policy issue rather than a particularized concern, the disadvantaged were much more likely to report that the problem affected themselves or their families as well as others in the community. When discussing basic human needs policy issues, 15 percent of the disadvantaged—as opposed to 21 percent of the advantaged—indicated that the issue affected them as well as others. Taken together, of those who communicated to public officials about some issue of basic human needs, 71 percent of the disadvantaged but only 29 percent of the advantaged discussed something with an immediate impact upon themselves or their families. It is axiomatic in the literature on lobbying that public officials listen more carefully to self-interested advocates who are affected by the policies they discuss. Presumably, the analogous principle applies to communications from individuals: stories about basic human needs sound different to policymakers when told by those who are themselves in need.

Furthermore, when they communicate with public officials about policy matters concerning issues of basic human need, the advantaged and disadvantaged convey quite different messages. The appropriate govern-
mental role is addressing problems related to basic human needs is an issue about which there is profound disagreement in American society. Close reading of what people actually said about the issues and problems associated with their participation allowed us to differentiate among messages about public efforts on behalf of the needy. On the one hand were expressions of concern about the "homeless plight" and "the Commission for visually handicapped Blind Association. To increase their benefits." On the other were such identifiable conservative statements as "welfare should be swept away with" and "is dislike big government, [and] welfare state, and big brothers." Not all the policy statements about basic human needs could be so readily categorized. However, to the extent that the disadvantaged—whether liberal or conservative in their overall opinions as expressed in the interview—made identifiable policy statements about basic human needs in association with political activity, none of their statements urged that public attention in times of basic human need be reduced. In contrast, the views about basic human need expressed by the advantaged through their activity were quite mixed. Because they are so much more active than the disadvantaged, however, public officials actually received more messages from the disadvantaged, suggesting a commitment of government intervention on behalf of the needy than messages from the disadvantaged urging the opposite.

Overcoming Participatory Inequality through Mobilization

What can be done to diminish the participation gap that separates the advantaged and the disadvantaged? Social activists have long paid attention to the processes by which citizens are mobilized into politics. In particular, they have focused on the way that social movements—whether composed of assembly-line workers, civil rights activists, environmentalists, advocates of school prayers, or opponents of higher taxes—bring new issues and therefore new public into politics. Presumably because they

15. On the effects of direct interpersonal matters on participation, see Knoke (1976), among the few studies of direct and indirect mobilization in Knoke and L DOWN (1982) and WIT (1982). Social movement and Human (1995) with its important role of mobilization in explaining activity. This does not, however, put the side of strong ties in mobilizing citizens, not on the more personal interpersonal networks which citizens have, for a review of interpersonal scales, see Knoke and L DOWN (1982).

can provide a vehicle for the political activation of those who would otherwise be quiescent, social movements among the disadvantaged have received considerable attention. The CIO's and their allies in the labor movement, for example, have been successful in using the tools of collective action to achieve significant gains for their members. As a result, many social movements have emerged in response to the needs of the disadvantaged. In this way, social movements can provide a means for the disadvantaged to express their grievances and to seek redress for the injustices they face. This process is known as mobilization.
only respond positively to these incentives but also be effective as partici-
pants.

When taken as a whole, these processes of rational prospecting through which citizens are asked by elites to take part politically do not, by and large, mobilize excluded constituencies to politics. Rather, the overall thrust is to reinforce the tendencies of a participatory process anchored in the individual characteristics that predict political participa-
tion. That is, those who are, by dint of their desire and ability, more likely to be politically active are also more likely to be the targets of appeals for activity. In short, when viewed in its entirety, the process of citizen recruitment does not mobilize the marginal and dispossessed. In fact, by reorienting activities on the basis of the same factors that would lead individuals to participate on their own, rational prospectors bring to politics a set of actors whose participatory characteristics are even more pronounced than the characteristics of those who would have taken part spontaneously.

Who Is Recruited?

By searching for targets who are likely to be willing to take part in politics and who will be effective as activists when they do, those who seek to get others involved in politics use as cues the kinds of characteristics that are associated with participation in politics. The single best predictor of political activity is education: those who are well educated are more likely both to be motivated to take part and to be endowed with the resources that facilitate participation. Across various types of activity, the higher the level of education, the more likely an individual will be targeted by recruit-

ents. Thus, beyond the individual endowments that make them likely to be active, the well educated are also exposed to recruitment efforts. The result is that those citizens who come to their activity through recruitment are not only, as expected, better educated than the population as a whole but also better educated than those who came to their activity spontaneously. The difference is substantial: 45 percent of those who undertook at least one participatory act in response to a request have a college degree only 31 percent of those who undertook at least one act spontaneously have a

CIVIC PARTICIPATION AND THE EQUALITY PROBLEM

Table 12-2. Spontaneous and Recruited Political Activity by Family Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Income</th>
<th>Spontaneous</th>
<th>Recruited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than $15,000</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000-$34,999</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$35,000-$49,999</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50,000-$74,999</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$75,000-$124,999</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$125,000 and over</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. An act for which there was today an request or a single request that was denied.
b. An act for which there was at least one request that was granted.

college degree. Analogous figures about income tell a similar story. We have already seen in Figure 12-1 that political activity rises with income. Table 12-2, which shows the proportion in each income group who undertook at least one political activity spontaneously and the proportion who undertook at least one act in response to a request, indicates that activity under experiment is much less highly structured by income than is activity undertaken as the result of recruitment. In the lowest income category, respondents were much more likely to have taken part spontaneously than to have been active after being asked. In the top two categories the proportions active in each way are nearly equal.

The exaggeration of participatory strains through the process of recruitment is especially pronounced for political contributions. Earlier we noted that, political giving is the most stratified of all activities: the well treated are more likely to contribute, and the more affluent they are, the more they contribute. In making requests, recruiters selectively target those with deep pockets. In our survey, contributors were, as a group, more affluent than noncontributors, whose mean family income was $35,500.

3. We define as spontaneous action those who did not receive a request to become active in that particular way or were asked once and did not say yes. We consider as recruited action those who were asked to take part at least once and who agreed to the request more readily. We have found the distinction to be meaningful in that which respondents reported were taken as requests for a particular kind of activity and not to the most recent one. In short, we could not ascertain whether they had been exposed to a previous request even though the most recent one was treated above.

22. See elaboration of these themes in Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, chaps. 7 and 12).
However, among contributors, those who gave in response to a request were especially well-heeded: their average family income was $56,400, whereas the average income was $43,000 for those who contributed spontaneously. Considering the size of the donation rather than the size of the packetbook of the donor demonstrates especially clearly that recruits look where the money is and find it. Contributions given spontaneously averaged $129—only a fraction of those given in response to a request, which averaged $352.

The process by which contributors are recruited thus reinforces the overrepresentation of the well-heeded in participation. Figure 12-5 presents data on the proportion of campaign money contributed by various income groups. In Figure 12-3 we saw that the affluent 9 percent of the population (those with incomes over $75,000) were responsible for fully 53 percent of all campaign money given, while the poorest 19 percent (those with incomes under $15,000) were responsible for only 2 percent. However, if we consider separately donations given spontaneously and donations given in response to a request, we see that the process of recruitment further exaggerates this pattern. Of all funds contributed in response to requests, nearly two-thirds, 64 percent, derived from the most affluent 9 percent of the public and only 1 percent from the least affluent 19 percent of the public. The pattern for donations made spontaneously, while still skewed, is much less pronounced.

Those who are brought into politics through these processes of selective recruitment differ not only in their demographic characteristics but also in their need for government assistance. Consider the beneficiaries of government programs discussed earlier. Fifty-two percent of the respondents to the survey said they had been asked at least once to become politically active. Medical recipients, 49 percent of whom received at least one request for activity, were recruited with about the same frequency as members of the general public. In contrast, only 30 percent of those receiving Medicaid—a means-tested health program for the poor—were recruited at least once. The figures for participants in the principal income-maintenance programs are almost identical: 48 percent of Social Security recipients, but only 39 percent of AFDC recipients, indicated having been asked at least once to take part. With respect to housing, a policy area that often generates political conflict, 58 percent of those who reported at least one request for participation, only 40 percent of those who do not own their own home reported receiving at least one such request. Only 28 percent of recipients of government housing subsidies, however, received such requests.
CIVIC PARTICIPATION AND THE EQUALITY PROBLEM

Figure 12-5. From Which Income Groups Do Political Contributions Come?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Category</th>
<th>Contributions from Each Income Category</th>
<th>Total Population in Each Income Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under $15,000</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000-$34,999</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$35,000-$69,999</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over $75,000</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Spontaneous contributions from each income category:

- Affluent: 8%
- Poor: 19%

Recruited contributions from each income category:

- Affluent: 19%
- Poor: 40%
In contrast to the organizational, neighborhood, and workplace networks of personal ties that figure so importantly in the recruitment of political activists, are impersonal processes of direct-mail fund-raising. It seems as if everybody's mailbox is swarmed with requests for political contributions. However, as shown in Figure 12-6, political direct mail is not sent out indiscriminately. Half of those in the lowest income category indicated that they never receive political mail. Only a small fraction of those in the highest income categories—who presumably are on other mailing lists and are concentrated in prestigious zip codes—reported ever getting any political mail.

In short, while processes of mobilization may bring new issues and points of view to those who govern, our data demonstrate that they do not—when considered in their totality—bring new kinds of people into politics. Because recruiters act as rational prospectors, they seek out people who would be likely not only to participate but to participate effectively—that is, people with the characteristics already overrepresented among participants. In short, the net result of the recruitment process for political activity in general—and for financial contributions in particular—is to exacerbate participatory stratification.
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Can Institutions Make the Difference?

Since the ordinary processes by which individuals are asked to take part in politics—for example, to attend a school board meeting, make a campaign donation, or march for or against abortion—do not ameliorate participatory bias, what about voluntary institutions? Voluntary institutions, even ones that are overtly apolitical, operate in many ways other than advocacy to foster political participation. As Tocqueville noted a century and a half ago, associations act as the schools for democracy. Moreover, activity in institutions that have nothing to do with politics or public issues can foster the development of organizational and communications skills that are relevant for politics and thus can facilitate political activity. Organizing the FTA Book Fair, chairing a large charity benefit, or serving on the search committee for a new minister are not overly political activities. Yet they foster the development of skills that can be transferred to politics. In addition, voluntary institutions can act as the locus of attempts at political recruitment; members make social contacts and, thus, become part of networks through which requests for participation are mediated. And of course association members are exposed to political cues and messages—in communications from officers and staff, on the agendas of meetings, even in informal conversations with fellow members.

It is naive to expect the institutions of civil society to be the magic remedy to overcome the class-based participatory deficit, for the proposed cure contains the seeds of the malady. Just as those who are well educated and well heeled are more likely to be activist in politics, they are more likely to be affiliated with voluntary organizations. Data collected in 1967 indicate that those on the highest rung of the income ladder were three times as likely to be active members of organizations as those at the bottom. In 1990 the

23. For an empirical analysis of the ways in which class-based institutions mobilize individuals to politics, see Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978). Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) demonstrate the importance of efforts by strategic elites in parties and organizations in explaining changes over time in rates of citizen participation. Many studies of parties have illustrated their role in getting out the vote or in organizing activists or mobilizing grass-roots constituents. A pioneering study of efforts to bring out the vote is Goodell (1947). See also Altemeyer (1984), Hochbritn and Sprague (1982), and Wellenroth and Ladanyi (1994). On the efforts of organized interests to recruit former constituted and get members involved in politics, see Schlueter and Tillery (1988) and Walker (1991). Among the many case studies that illustrate these phenomena, see Bowen (1988) and Rondenburg (1992). Cohen and Dovers (1985) show that contact increased campaign contributions and attendance at community meetings in Denver.
ratio was exactly the same. Thus, the participatory benefits of organizational activity are being reaped by those who are likely to be politically involved already. However, even though affiliation with voluntary organizations, when taken in toto, has a strong socio-economic bias, particular institutions of civil society might function to overcome that bias.

With the considerable interest in citizen groups whose growing importance is documented in Jeffrey Berry’s contribution to this volume?Certainly a few of these groups—e.g., the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People—that received a great deal of television coverage in 1980 are as advocates for, among others, the economically disadvantaged. Nevertheless, Berry indicates that these groups hold values that are “sometime at odds with the interests of those further down the economic ladder” and concludes by observing that, at the same time that groups opposing nonmaterial values have flourished, unions and other traditional liberal interest groups who have pushed for greater economic equality for workers and the poor have weakened. Indeed, we cannot expect that citizen groups will carry this representational burden.

Where, then, might we find institutions with counter-stratification effects? Political parties are an obvious answer. Within a democracy an important function of political parties—especially parties of the left—is the mobilization of ordinary citizens—in particular, those who might not otherwise be active. During the nineteenth century strong political parties played a critical role in organizing and mobilizing votes in America. Nonetheless, American political parties are well known for being weak and fragmented, and there are no working-class or peasant parties.

The Citizen Participation Study is deficient in material about the operation of political parties as institutions, but we can use the information about the characteristics of those who ask others to get involved in political activities to infer the implications of recruitment through partisan networks. Table 12-3 shows, not surprisingly, that Republican identifiers had higher average incomes—and Democratic identifiers had lower average incomes—than the average for the population. It also shows, again not surprisingly, that those recruited to work in campaigns—and, especially, those recruited to contribute to campaigns—had higher than average incomes, higher even than the average for Republican identifiers. When we focus more narrowly on recruitment among fellow partisans, we find more

24. The data for 1972 are reported in Verba and Nie (1972, chap. 21). The 1980 data are from the Citizen Participation Study.
The participatory benefits of organizations who are likely to be politically affiliated with voluntary organizing groups or co-ethnic bias, particular institutions to overcome that bias, whose growing importance is discussed in this volume. Certainly a few of the Civil Liberties Union and the National Colored People—men who received a great deal as advocates for, among others, the unemployed. Johnson indicates that these groups do not with the interests of those further studies by observing that, at the same ritual values have dwindled. Unions and organizations that have pushed for greater equality have weakened. In short, we cannot avoid the representation of a burden, situations with counter-factual rational answers. Within a democracy as an idea, especially parties of the left, is the —in particular, those who might not seventh century strong political parties and mobilizing voters in America is well known for being weak and in-group or passive parties. In the case of information, we can use the data, information, we talk about the tigresses, but we do not have sufficient data on the average age in population. It also shows, again not to work in campaigns—and, especially, campaigns—had higher average age for Republican identifiers. When we compare fellow partisans, we find more mean age for Republican identifiers.

### Table 12.3: Family Income and Recruitment for Campaign Activity: The Partisan Connection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average family income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>$40,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Republican identifiers</td>
<td>$45,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Democratic identifiers</td>
<td>$36,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All who were asked to work in a campaign</td>
<td>$48,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican asked by a Republican</td>
<td>$51,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats asked by a Democrat</td>
<td>$49,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All who were asked to contribute to a campaign</td>
<td>$52,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican asked by a Republican</td>
<td>$56,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats asked by a Democrat</td>
<td>$54,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

showing in an upward direction. The inter-party nexus involved recruitment of targets who had, on average, higher-than-average incomes for their respective parties. For contributions, the pattern is especially striking. Those asked by a fellow partisan had, on average, incomes that were quite high. The data make it difficult to argue that the processes of intrapartisan recruitment are in any way expanding participatory representation. When Democrats solicited Democrats and Republicans solicited Republicans, the targets of the requests had family incomes that were substantially higher than the average incomes for their fellow partisans but also higher than the average for all who were asked to contribute. Partisan recruitment to take part in a campaign—and especially to contribute money—seems to increase the stratification of political participation in both parties.

In short, while parties have unambiguously played an important historical role in mobilizing voters who might otherwise not go to the polls and in representing the concerns of broad groups whose views might otherwise not be voiced, with respect to the recruitment of activists, the result is more mixed. When seeking contributions rather than votes or campaign workers, the parties hunt where the ducks are and target the affluent among their supporters.

What about Unions? What about Churches?

Aside from parties of the left, what other institutions might serve as the vehicle for the political activation of the less privileged? A student of...
comparative politics might immediately suggest that we consider unions: a structure of American society might propose that we look at churches.

Among the ways in which American politics is alleged to be exceptional among the world’s democracies is the weakness of the institutions that, in other nations, bring disadvantaged groups to full participation in political life. We have already mentioned that the Democratic Party plays only very irrespectively the role adopted elsewhere by social democratic and labor parties in mobilizing those who might otherwise not take part politically. In many other democracies, politically engaged trade unions serve as partners of parties of the left in organizing the less affluent. However, in contrast to their counterparts overseas, American labor unions have traditionally been relatively weak and enroll a relatively small—and diminishing—proportion of the work force.

An aspect of American exceptionalism that receives less attention in discussions of politics is the depth of religious commitment of American citizens and the relative frequency of their religious attendance. As Robert Wuthnow’s chapter in this volume demonstrates, participation in religious institutions is the least class-biased form of voluntary activity. In fostering participative, American churches function in a manner similar to voluntary associations: they nurture politically relevant skills, generate requests for political participation, and expose members to explicitly political messages. Thus, religious institutions in America might partially compensate for the weakness of unions and the absence of a labor or social democratic party by bringing into politics those who might not otherwise be involved.

Figure 12-7 presents data for various income groups about these involvements. As anticipated, organizational involvement is structured by income and is almost universal in the higher-income groups. Church membership, in contrast, varies very little among income groups. Among those with the lowest income, the same proportion, 63 percent, were organizational and church members. At the top of the income hierarchy, fully 96 percent were affiliated with an organization, but only 66 percent were church members. In contrast to organizational affiliation, union affiliation does not seem to rise with income. Instead, the pattern is curvilinear, with the highest and lowest income groups having the lowest levels of union affiliation. Thus, it would seem that engagement with unions and religious institutions presents the possibility of, if not overcoming, at least not exacerbating participatory stratification.

Nevertheless, the other obvious lesson provided by the data is Figure 12-7 is the extent to which church membership overshadows union affili-
CIVIC PARTICIPATION AND THE EQUALITY PROBLEM

Table 12-7. Civic Involvement, by Family Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Level</th>
<th>Affiliated with an organization *</th>
<th>Affiliated with a union *</th>
<th>Member of a church *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under $15,000</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000-$35,000</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$35,000-$50,000</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50,000-$75,000</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$75,000-$125,000</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over $125,000</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.

Note: The table above shows the proportion of individuals affiliated with organizations, unions, and church memberships by family income level. The data indicates a trend where higher income levels are associated with higher rates of civic involvement.

Text continued:

uation. At every income level, the proportion who are church members simply dwarfs the proportion in unions. If they were merely nominal, these memberships would mean little in terms of exposure to institutional political stimuli. However, in this respect as well, churches appear to have the advantage. Church members are more likely actually to attend services than are union members to attend union meetings. Of union members, 52
percent indicated having gone to at least one union meeting within the past year; 94 percent of church members reported having attended services within the past year.

Participatory Equality and the Structure of Civil Society in America

The unusual institutional configuration characteristic of American society has important consequences for the outcomes with which we are concerned. Since churches and organizations, including unions, function similarly in fostering political activity, we might argue that the strength of religious institutions would counterbalance the weakness of labor unions. A blue-collar worker is more likely to have polarizing experiences that develop civic skills in church than in a union—not because American unions are particularly deficient in building civic skills and providing exposure to political messages and requests for political activity, but because so few American blue-collar workers are union members and so many are church members. Hence, because churches can punish the union for discouraging participation, we might conclude that the weakness of American unions has an implication for the representation of the needs and preferences of the less well off in American politics.

Nonetheless, these institutions are not interchangeable when it comes to reducing participatory inequality. Churches and unions are not simply politically neutral sites that encourage political participation as a by-product of other purposes: they are institutions with political concerns of their own. It has long been a part of the union mission to represent the less advantaged in the halls of government. Although religious institutions sometimes take on this function—the Catholic Church, for example, often acts as an advocate for the poor—the economic needs of the less well off rarely top their list of political priorities. Thus, when a church makes institutionally based attempts to mobilize the flock for political action, or when it gets involved directly in politics, the policy matter at stake is relatively unlikely to be an economic agenda focused on the less advantaged. Over the years, churches in America have embraced many issues ranging from trespassance to civil rights. At this juncture religious institutions are active on behalf of a wide range of issues and diverse points of view. However, the center of gravity of the religious agenda in politics is a conservative concern with social issues with a
particular focus on advocacy of pro-life views on abortion. Though the
most prominent of American religious institutions are likely to continue
to evolve, there is no reason to expect them to act as a substitute for
unions or other organizations representing the least well off in bringing
to the attention of public officials the economic needs and preferences
of the disadvantaged.

In comparison with other democracies, political conflict in America
has traditionally been less deeply imbued with the rhetoric of class. In
recent years, however, references to class seem to have become less common
in our political vocabulary than at any time since the New Deal, a circum-
stance that we could, spectaculously attribute to a number of develop-
ments over the past decade or two; the success of the Republican Party in
defining itself as the party of the common folk; the focus by the Democratic
Party on the needs of the middle class rather than the poor as the object of
government attention; the erosion of the membership and power of labor
unions; the emphasis on multiculturalism; the fall of communism in
Russia and Eastern Europe; and the declining appeal of Marxist social
analysis as an intellectual tool; and changing occupational structures and
the concomitant reduction in manufacturing employment. Nevertheless,
it is clear that, in spite of the absence of references to class in our political
discourse, when it comes to political participation, class matters pro-
dounds for American politics.

At present, the decline of civic engagement is a matter of contention.
The inequality of civic engagement is unambiguously. Moreover, analysis of
the new rich data set, the Royer Trends in American Political Participa-
tion, suggests that participatory inequality is a consistent attribute of civic
life. In spirit of middle-class reductions, there is no clear secular trend between
1974 and 1994: participatory inequality rose somewhat in the late 1970s,
fell during the early 1980s, and ended the two-decade period almost
exactly where it started.25 Extrapolating from these findings, we can expect
that, as long as inequalities in education and income persist—and income
inequality in America has become more pronounced of late—as long as
jobs continue to distribute opportunities to practice civic skills in a strati-
fied manner, and as long as citizens increasingly donate money rather than
participate in civil society, the voices heard through the medium of citizen
participation might be loud and clear, but they will be far from equal.

References


